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As many dissident artists have noted over the years, Irish society in the first half of the 
twentieth century tended to be closed and introverted, dominated by authoritarian 
traditions well entrenched in both church, state and many parts of civil society. 
Journalism too was influenced by the general cultural climate in which censorship thrived 
and it developed no great tradition of independence or assertiveness. The general 
tendency towards caution made it easier for political authorities to keep the media under 
control. So in the ten years before Section 31 was activated, it is not surprising to find 
that the urge to control broadcasting output was constantly bubbling under the political 
surface, though governments hesitated at the thought of actually invoking their legislative 
power to censor. It is worth reviewing the period of the 1960s briefly, to get a sense of 
this urge and the tensions that existed between government and the public broadcasting 
system it created. 
 
The urge to censor 
Shortly after Tom Hardiman became Director General in April 1968, the Chairman of 
RTÉ, Todd Andrews, invited the Minister in charge of Broadcasting, Erskine Childers, to 
dinner to meet the new Chief Executive of the country’s most important cultural 
organisation. RTÉ had come through its first seven years of existence, the last three of 
them characterised by growing unhappiness among the staff at what was seen as 
increasing pressure from ministers to control television output in their favour. In the 
course of the meal, the Minister handed Andrews a plain sheet of paper containing about 
a dozen names of RTÉ employees and programme guests who, according to the Minister, 
were ‘lefties, if not card carrying Communists, who should be treated as suspect 
subversives’. The Minister refused to disclose the source of the document, but Andrews 
immediately replied that it had been compiled by the Garda Special Branch (recently the 
object of a television documentary probe) under the inspiration of the ‘paranoid 
Department of Justice’, that RTÉ would pay no attention to the allegations, and that it 
was not the job of the Special Branch to ‘institute a system of thought control or act as 
purveyors of political gossip’.1 The Chairman made the point that as a young man he and 
many of his associates had suffered from harassment by the Special Branch, some being 
driven to emigration, and that he was determined that no one should suffer economically 
or otherwise for their political opinions. He later put these thoughts to the Minister in a 
letter and asked that it be shown to the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass. It wasn’t, but secret lists 
were never mentioned again. 
 
This dinner table vignette illustrates the enormous vulnerability of RTÉ to manipulation 
by the forces of the state. What is at stake is the demonstrated power of the media to 
shape the agenda of public discussion, to impose a primary definition on a controversy 
and to put a particular frame around issues of vital importance to the health of a 
democracy. RTÉ had to learn, through several bitter experiences, how to handle pressure 
from government and facilitate the emergence of an ethos that would have more in 
common with an ideal of public broadcasting rather than a state broadcasting model. Irish 
broadcasters and politicians had to learn, slowly and painfully, how to reconcile the 
desire for political freedom and the liberty of political choice, with the need to defend the 
cultural preconditions and accommodations on which both depend in the public sphere, 
especially freedom of expression. 
 
There is no doubt that government found it extremely difficult to come to terms with the 
new radio and television organisation that it had created. Boundaries between 
government and RTÉ had to be established pragmatically, by experimentation and within 
the political culture of the time, each side testing its power and gauging possible 
reactions. Before the station opened, its first Director General, Ed Roth, asserted that 
RTÉ ‘would not be a political organ of the government of the day’. After six long years 
of frustration, much of it with RTÉ’s news and current affairs output, during which he 
dallied with the notion of establishing a Minister for Information to oversee the work of 
RTÉ, Lemass made his famous declaration in the Dáil that ‘RTÉ was set up by legislation 
as an instrument of public policy and as such is responsible to the Government…to this 
extent the Government reject the view that RTÉ should be, either generally or in regard to 
its current affairs and news programmes, completely independent of Government 
supervision’.2   
 
This well-prepared assertion of government power was prompted by a row between 
Charles Haughey, Minister for Agriculture, and the National Farmers Association, that 
dragged RTÉ - government tensions fully into the public spotlight. Haughey complained 
to the RTÉ Newsroom about the insulting juxtaposition on the news of a statement from 
the NFA with a statement of his own. The NFA statement was deleted from subsequent 
bulletins. The NUJ and the Dublin newspapers were incensed by this interference. 
Haughey responded with further pressure on the current affairs television programme 
Division, which insisted on presenting both government and farmers’ views. Haughey 
boycotted the programme but Division continued without Fianna Fáil input and its sister, 
the current affairs programme Seven Days, responded by devoting a whole week of 
programming to media freedom, exploring government and commercial interference in 




Todd Andrews believed in the Lemass doctrine that it was the duty of the RTÉ Authority 
to support official policy and this emerged clearly in his handling of the Hanoi affair. The 
Authority initially supported the sending of a television team to North Vietnam in April 
1967, feeling that RTÉ coverage of the war relied excessively on British and American 
sources, and that it was time that RTÉ developed a more ambitious news gathering 
operation in its coverage of world affairs. An Irish point of view could replace what was 
perceived as an excessive reliance on a British or American interpretation. When the 
Department of Foreign Affairs objected to this, Andrews’ concern was to find out if the 
objection was based on a government decision or merely the personal view of an 
individual Minister. He considered, and then rejected, the possibility of insisting that if 
the government wanted the project cancelled, it should exercise its statutory powers of 
veto by issuing a formal instruction. He telephoned Jack Lynch, who had succeeded Sean 
Lemass as Taoiseach, and they agreed to publish a public statement to the effect that 
sending a news team to Hanoi ‘would be an embarrassment to the Government in relation 
to its foreign policy’.4 A short time later, a Seven Days team led by Muiris MacConghail, 
on its way to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War, was recalled when it was already in 
Lisbon, though Todd Andrews was at pains to point out to Garret FitzGerald at the time 
that the Irish Government was not involved in the decision. Despite this setback, a 
programme on Biafra was put together, combining acquired footage with an RTÉ 
commentary. This was criticised by the Nigerian Ambassador for giving ‘an unfavourable 
and unfair impression of the Nigerian Government’ and the Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs asked the Authority for a copy of the programme. The uproar that ensued 
inside RTÉ, in the newspapers and in Dáil Éireann, focused on both inappropriate use of 
government power in broadcasting and excessive acquiescence to this power by RTÉ. 
 
The effects on RTÉ 
Arising from these skirmishes, there were significant long-term consequences for the 
national broadcaster. Staff morale and confidence in senior management were left 
severely bruised. Many felt the Authority, which had been appointed to defend the rights 
of free expression in broadcasting, had abandoned those rights. Todd Andrews himself 
regretted not having insisted that the government use its statutory veto power, though this 
extended only to preventing the transmission of a programme, not gathering material for 
its production. Yet he and the Authority went on to veto a programme dealing with the 
activities of the Garda Special Branch, after it had been made and scheduled for 
transmission. The subsequent moving of Seven Days to the News Division, widely seen 
by staff as an expression of no confidence by the Authority in the Programmes Division, 
brought the organisation to the brink of an all-out strike.
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 Yet the government assumption 
throughout the 1960s, that it should control RTÉ as tightly as it could a government 
department, continued to impinge on the organisation and on public perceptions of the 
‘independence’, or lack of it, in the national broadcasting organisation. When Director 
General, Kevin McCourt, resigned and the RTÉ Authority was in the process of selecting 
his successor, the Minister, Erskine Childers, conveyed the government’s interest in 
knowing the names of applicants for the job, a request refused by Todd Andrews on the 
grounds of an obligation to observe confidentiality for all candidates. 
 
The impact of Section 31 on RTÉ after 1972 has been well documented elsewhere (see 
especially Horgan, 2004 and other contributions in this volume), so only a few brief 
observations will be made here. Firstly, Section 31 acted as a censoring device in political 
communication for a long time but it can be argued that it also provided a form of 
protection for RTÉ in other areas. It allowed broadcasters to deflect inappropriate 
government pressure by pointing out that there was a statutory method available – the 
written directive – should government choose to use it. Both sides knew that government 
was unwilling, for political reasons, to invoke Section 31 except in the most serious 
circumstances. Secondly, Irish newspapers provided very little editorial support for RTÉ 
in its early difficulties with political censorship (though NUJ members supported their 
colleagues in RTÉ who used a 48-hour work stoppage to protest against Kevin O’Kelly’s 
conviction in 1972). There is even some evidence that a ‘Section 31 mind-set’ took a hold 
on newspapers too, though they of course had no legal obligations under the 1960 Act.
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Thirdly, many of the more absurd applications of Section 31 (such as its extension to 
court reporting, or the cutting of two minutes from a Robert Kee documentary on Irish 
history purchased from ITV, or the censoring of Sinn Féin members’ views on industrial 
relations disputes or rose-growing or bee-keeping) can be traced to the imprecise 
language in which directives were written and government refusal to offer clarification. 
The technique used by Kevin O’Kelly in his controversial 1972 radio programme, for 
instance - reporting on an interview with an IRA leader without allowing the leader’s 
voice on air - was used by another journalist, Liam Hourican, a little while earlier and 
produced no adverse government reaction. (In the attempt to allow some information 
about the IRA to be transmitted, RTÉ reporters later resorted to the expedient of having 
one journalist interview another journalist who had interviewed an IRA member.) 
Fourthly, the history of RTÉ’s adjustment to Section 31 directives is characterized by 
complex tensions between and within trade unions in broadcasting, and between the RTÉ 
branch and the NUJ headquarters. Tensions between the National Union of Journalists 
and the Workers Union of Ireland were particularly strong and tended to amplify existing 
organizational turf wars between News (staffed mostly by NUJ members) and Current 
Affairs (staffed mostly by WUI members in the Programmes Division) over coverage of 
general elections, budgets and other critical events. Attempts to answer the rather 
innocent question of why RTÉ workers could not have found a consensus against 
accepting censorship, or in favour of constantly testing the limits of the regulations, must 
take this frequently fractious and bitter trade union history into account. 
 
Many of the later criticisms of RTÉ’s excessive caution in investigative journalism and 
its constant apprehensions about government attitudes in general, should be examined in 
the context of organizational reactions to a prolonged period of censorship. Editorial 
caution can be seen in hindsight as one of the long-term, deep structural effects of Section 
31. A 1977 NUJ document, for example, notes that ‘the ultra-cautious atmosphere which 
Section 31 and the guidelines have fostered in the newsroom and programme sections has 
meant that enquiries into controversial areas have not been encouraged…There is now a 
general anxiety about tackling stories which might embarrass the government on the issue 
of security’.7 Ten years later, an International Federation of Journalists fact-finding 
mission to Ireland to examine the question of news censorship pointed to several 
contradictions in the application of Section 31, including the banning of Sinn Féin from 
the airwaves but the official recognition of it as a legitimate political party. Several 
journalists and editors interviewed by the IFJ team saw Section 31 in the light of Irish 
Governments responding to British pressure, while at the same time gaining some 
electoral advantage at home in denying publicity to Sinn Féin. The IFJ concluded that 
‘the most dangerous effect of the present Section 31 practice is the creation of a general 
climate in which restrictions on the media and free journalism are accepted and 
defended’.8 
 
Post Section 31 adjustments  
The Section 31 directive was finally allowed to lapse in January 1994 in the lead-in to 
establishing a new IRA cease-fire.
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 The British ban was lifted shortly afterwards. The 
Minister in charge of broadcasting, Michael D. Higgins, argued that ‘deterministic’ views 
of television’s power over viewers were now outdated and that people had the capacity to 
make up their own minds about what they saw on television. The final act in the long 
saga of Section 31 was RTÉ’s own difficult adjustment to the new censorship-free 
environment. This writer found himself at the centre of this period of change, as a 
participant rather than an observer, when he was appointed Chairman of the RTÉ 
Authority for the period from 1995 to 2000. 
 
Passionate debate was the order of the day when we came to discuss how RTÉ journalists 
were handling Sinn Féin interviews, in a broadcasting atmosphere adapting very 
cautiously to the ending of the ban. In the opinion of many commentators, but probably 
not a majority on the RTÉ Authority, the decisive ministerial action of allowing the 
Section 31 directive to lapse, reversing a policy that had been in place for two decades, 
was to play a major role in advancing the peace process in Northern Ireland. I believe 
historical hindsight will validate this judgment. But in the first few years of post-Section 
31 broadcasting, I could never be sure that a majority of my colleagues didn’t deeply 
resent the newfound freedom of Sinn Féin to speak directly to journalists and to Irish 
audiences. Over the previous two decades, many complex layers of self-censorship 
regarding ‘The Troubles’ had evolved within RTÉ, aided by the formation of unofficial 
staff watchdog groups associated with Sinn Féin the Workers Party, which had descended 
directly from Official Sinn Féin after the split in the Republican movement in the early 
1970s. The ‘Stickies’, as they were popularly known, had become increasingly 
sympathetic to unionist and revisionist interpretations of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
and pushed their newfound interpretation of the conflict through the Ned Stapleton 
Cumann, which operated within the RTÉ branch of the Workers’ Union of Ireland. 
Pressures towards censorship, deeply embedded in different parts of the organisation, 
intimidated staff into accepting, however reluctantly, forms of self-censorship that went 
far beyond the letter of Section 31. President Mary McAleese has given some insight into 
the editorial atmosphere of her time in RTÉ, sometimes encountering a tendency towards 
anti-Nationalist bullying in her work as a researcher in Current Affairs, especially around 
the time when hunger striker Bobby Sands was elected to Parliament at Westminster in 
the early 1980s.
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 Revisionism had also taken a grip on most of the national newspapers, 
to the extent that many print journalists avoided important stories like the Guilford Four 
and the Birmingham Six miscarriages of justice, for fear of being labelled Provo 
sympathisers. 
 
The challenge in 1996 was how to sweep away the damaging aftermath of the censorious 
mindset of the ‘Stickies’ and remove the fear of being a ‘hush puppy’ (the derogatory 
term used to signify those considered to be ‘soft’ on the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin). 
The challenge was made all the more difficult because of the deeply coded way in which 
discussion of this problem usually took place within RTÉ, even at senior management 
level. It was difficult for a newcomer like myself to decode some of the talk, and some of 
the silences, about the internal censorship campaign waged by the ‘Stickies’. In some 
cases, there were obvious similarities with the anti-communism hysteria and the purges 
of staff in the US media industry in the early 1950s, where various layers of guilt for not 
recognising and resisting the danger to free speech represented by McCarthy outlasted the 
end of the actual purges by several years. 
 
The question of how to handle Sinn Féin, newly released from years of broadcasting 
exile, surfaced in Authority discussions in 1996, initially in the form of reactions to news 
coverage of anti-drugs campaigns in Dublin’s inner-city neighbourhoods and Sinn Féin’s 
role in them. There is a certain irony in the fact that as journalists were adjusting slowly 
to the ending of Section 31 censorship, RTÉ was at the same time working to increase its 
transmission power northwards. This reflected the belief that by achieving symmetry of 
television reception on both sides of the border RTÉ could play a role in increasing 
mutual understanding between unionist and nationalist cultures and perhaps achieving 
reconciliation across the various borders of tradition, politics, religion, group memory 
and historical identity that had plagued Ireland for so long. RTÉ engaged in diplomatic 
negotiations and engineering field strength trials that precede full-power operations in a 
very low-key manner, announcing the increased television availability in the North only 
to television set dealers and on teletext. This was to avoid adverse reaction and 
xenophobic outbursts from politicians representing certain sections of Northern Ireland 
society who would abhor the ideological pollution that would start drenching the 
population from full-power RTÉ transmitters, now liberated from Section 31. 
The summer marching season in Northern Ireland presented special challenges to the 
Newsroom. How does a journalist maintain high standards of fairness, impartiality and 
objectivity in some of the highly-charged, key confrontations in the summer calendar, 
where one group is driven by fanatical feelings of group superiority, historically rooted in 
the need to intimidate neighbours, and another group is organising resistance to this 
triumphalism? There was a certain timidity on the part of the RTÉ Newsroom about 
coverage of the Northern Ireland summer confrontations over use of public space for 
marching, a fear that television news, as it sought to report on events, might in fact 
inflame those events. This was the old Yeatsian worry that our words and our pictures 
might send certain young men out to die. My academic instinct was to distrust this 
‘hypodermic’ paradigm of media effects – the notion of media directly, powerfully and 
uniformly influencing viewers – as a simplistic approach to understanding the television 
viewing experience, already abandoned by media theorists.
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 Whatever about a poet’s 
verse, television output has an impact that is more inclined to be indirect, complex and 
biased towards cultivating a ‘mainstream’ view.   
 
Some Authority colleagues worried about Charlie Bird’s animated style of delivery, in 
his reports from northern hotspots like Drumcree and the Apprentice Boys march in 
Derry.
12
 My fear was that an institutional timidity about reporting Northern Ireland, 
deeply entrenched in Section 31-induced self-censorship patterns, might continue to 
produce a televisual blandness that would bore and alienate audiences and lack relevance, 
rather than grip and involve the core RTÉ audience. If it is to remain relevant to Irish 
people, RTÉ must in fact be shielded from all forms of censorship, so that it can sharpen 
its critical edge. The colour and emotion in Charlie Bird’s reports were therefore to be 
valued for the way in which a real sense of the tensions in Northern Ireland could be 
communicated to people who rarely travel north of the border. After all, within a few 
years, new commercial radio and television stations would be reporting in their own 
graphic styles, unencumbered by any institutional memory of ‘Stickies’ or Section 31. 
 
The Sinn Féin challenge  
Such was the unhealthy legacy of Section 31 in RTÉ that loose talk about ‘robust 
journalism’ could be quickly recoded as ‘hush puppy journalism’ that might give succour 
to the Provos. Some colleagues on the Authority believed that the RTÉ Newsroom had a 
‘Republican agenda’ and that this was obvious in its coverage of the anti-drugs 
campaigns in Dublin, which did not sufficiently highlight the ‘sinister’ leadership role of 
Sinn Féin in these inner-city crusades against drug dealers. But side by side with this 
view on the Authority was the criticism that some RTÉ programmes were treating Sinn 
Féin politicians in an unnecessarily aggressive way. The phenomenon of selective 
perception operated consistently in this area, linking commentators’ personal orientations 
to ‘The Troubles’ with their perceptions of how RTÉ was handling Sinn Féin. In the 
jargon of the time, who was in charge of the news, ‘Stickies’ or ‘Shinners’? The question 
was something of a Rorschach test. 
 
In 1997, Authority discussions about Sinn Féin tended to focus on two questions: was 
Sinn Féin being given too much access on the airwaves and were RTÉ staff adequately 
prepared in interviews to manage the very considerable oratorical acumen believed to 
reside within the Sinn Féin organisation? Some colleagues felt RTÉ needed clearer 
editorial guidelines as to when it was appropriate to interview a Sinn Féin spokesperson, 
as the party was adroit in managing its media exposure to suit its own circumstances. We 
tended to disagree over whether there was too great a presence of Sinn Féin people on air. 
On the one hand, the party was relatively small in electoral terms and its share of 
broadcast time should arithmetically reflect this. On the other, decisions made by Sinn 
Féin were inherently more newsworthy than the moves of most other parties, since they 
were the main conduit of information from the IRA about maintaining a ceasefire, and 
later, moving towards decommissioning weapons, two key aspects of the unfolding 
drama of the peace process.   
 
There was by now no longer a strong belief among members of the Authority that there 
was a seriously sympathetic ethos in favour of Sinn Féin embedded among RTÉ staff, 
and certainly no fear of a conspiracy to promote its aims in contravention of the legal 
requirement for RTÉ to observe impartiality in its news and current affairs output. 
Eoghan Harris, long since retired from RTÉ, stridently kept alive his ‘hush puppy’ 
accusations from the vantage point of a weekly column in the Sunday Times, but the 
actual debate had moved on to the notion that RTÉ staff were simply not able to handle 
the very sophisticated debating skills of people like Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness 
and Mitchell McLoughlin. RTÉ managers were frustrated by Sinn Féin’s capacity not to 
respond to critical questions posed by journalists, or to respond only with bland truisms, 
particularly when challenged to clarify the Party’s relationship with the IRA. This was an 
obsessive question, on the lips of most journalists in 1998, and Sinn Féin was giving coy 
or evasive answers when challenged, or brilliant long-winded lectures on nationalist 
history. The ambiguity inherent in Sinn Féin’s depiction of its relationship with the IRA 
was intensely frustrating for many journalists, though commentators today would tend to 
acknowledge the necessary role played by ambiguity on all sides in this period, in 
keeping the peace process alive for so long. Most broadcast interviews quickly turned 
into very emotionally tense debates, and the concern about this at Authority and senior 
management levels tended to be framed in terms of perceived imbalances in debating 
skills: on the one side, naïve and poorly trained RTÉ journalists, and on the other, battle-
hardened men and women whose debating prowess stemmed from long years of training 
in survival skills, including, as we were reminded by one Authority colleague, 
preparation for the intense experience of interrogation in grim RUC and British Army 
conditions, far removed from the niceties of Dublin 4 studios. 
 
To my mind, the bottom line for the Authority was to avoid a situation where a heavy-
handed top-down regime of managerial control would be re-imposed on journalists 
before they had the time to get to grips with Sinn Féin’s debating style. It was vital to 
avoid the re-imposition of the rules of upward-referral put in place in the Newsroom in 
the immediate aftermath of the suspension of Section 31 but then relaxed. Even a partial 
re-imposition of censorship would be no help to the peace process. There was certainly 
an imbalance in many interviews on radio and television in this period, where RTÉ 
journalists seemed frequently to be losing the argument. Even the urbane Gay Byrne, 
who had interviewed kings, emperors and vagabonds with supreme confidence, seemed 
to some critics to come off second best in his very wary encounter with Gerry Adams on 
the Late Late Show. 
 
Any realistic analysis of the situation would have to conclude that Gerry Adams and 
Martin McGuinness were not at this time going to clarify the exact nature of their 
relationship with the IRA, no matter how high the ‘skill levels’ of RTÉ journalists. When 
they were allowed access to the airwaves from 1994 on, it was inevitable that they would 
have long, pent-up tales to tell of oppression and humiliation suffered by the nationalist 
population in Northern Ireland over many decades, whether or not we in the Republic 
wanted to listen. Sinn Féin had been waiting a long time to tell its side of a story. 
Hitherto, the story had had been dominated for a very long time by the press relations 
skills of the British army, aided by friends in the London newspaper establishment like 
the Daily Telegraph.
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 But RTÉ had been conditioned by decades of censorship to be 
unprepared for these outpourings, which were radically transforming the mix of political 
information available to Irish citizens. At no time was I sure that a majority of my 
colleagues on the Authority agreed with me, some claiming that they knew what was 
‘really going on’ inside what was called ‘Sinn Féin-IRA’. The problem was never 
formally put on the agenda for an Authority meeting and it was never voted on. My 
tendency was to put the brakes on discussions that took the form of circling back towards 
the comfort zone of the old Section 31 mentality. We compromised on a stance of light-
touch supervision by the Director General in this sensitive and contentious area, and 
avoided re-imposing upward-referral rules about contact with Sinn Féin.   
 
It was important not to let these teething difficulties in the initial stages of the post-
Section 31 era force us to decide prematurely on another very long-running question: 
should Television News and Current Affairs maintain their editorial separateness, or 
should they be organisationally merged, forming one structural entity where the 
‘rashness’ of reportorial impulses to chase the immediate story might be tempered by the 
more reflective and analytical instincts of Current Affairs? Such a hasty decision on our 
part might in fact have been counterproductive, in the sense of signalling that we 
expected Current Affairs to play the ‘safe’ role. All of our discussions on the future of 
Current Affairs in fact were critical of the voices of caution that envisaged Current 
Affairs as essentially the location for the elaboration of stories broken elsewhere in the 
Irish media. We were unanimous in urging Current Affairs to listen to the accusations of 
blandness and timidity levelled at RTÉ by its more intelligent critics, to invest resources 
in investigative journalism and to trust the Authority to be supportive when good 
journalistic work was accomplished, even if that might sometimes disturb political 
authorities and other vested interests in Irish society. 
 
The shadow of Section 31 still fell over RTÉ at the beginning of 1998 (four years after it 
had ceased to have legal power) when the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo 
Mowlam, decided to visit Republican and Loyalist prisoners in jail, to engage with their 
views on the peace process. Rules for allowing the views of paramilitaries to be broadcast 
were broken in at least one instance (an unauthorised interview with a UFF prisoner in 
the Maze prison, aired on Today with Pat Kenny) and were soon relaxed. But it is 
significant that what exercised minds in RTÉ at this time was not the intermittent airing 
of convicted prisoners’ views but the daily challenge of dealing with Sinn Féin as it 




Final considerations in this chapter must return to the question of the relationship 
between government and public broadcasters, whose programme output occupies a 
special place in public discourse. But one dimension of this special status is that it makes 
public broadcasting particularly vulnerable to the political urge to censor. This is not a 
uniquely Irish problem, as we can see from recent events in England and Italy. The 
Hutton Inquiry was established in London in the second half of 2003 to investigate the 
role of the BBC and the British Government in conveying to the public, information 
about the level of threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. It brought 
government-broadcaster tensions to new levels of intensity. Until Hutton, 2003 had been 
a very good year for the BBC. The New Labour Government had appointed one of Tony 
Blair’s advisors on broadcasting policy (author of the Davies Report on the BBC) to be 
Chairman and had promised a major role for the BBC in the roll out of digital television, 
after the collapse of private sector efforts in Digital Terrestrial Television. Its Freesat 
digital system was destined to take the Corporation to new heights of success even 
beyond the borders of the UK. But all this depends ultimately on the continued goodwill 
of the British Government. Even before the Gilligan / Campbell clash which lead to the 
Hutton Inquiry, many in New Labour were asking, is the BBC not biting the hand that 
feeds it, in a most public and embarrassing way, through its news coverage of Iraq? The 
devastating findings of the Hutton Report, which exonerated the government and blamed 
the BBC for editorial and reporting shortcomings in its coverage of the war, resulted in 
the resignation of both the Chairman and Director General. The BBC has been badly 
shaken and it remains to be seen how these two major British institutions, Government 
and public broadcaster, will relate to each other in the future. 
 
In other countries, governments lean towards the view that private television companies 
can be trusted to be more supine than public broadcasters when it comes to the watchdog 
role of the media. Hostile newspapers are not to be taken lightly at election time, but 
hostile television channels are too much to tolerate. In Italy, the Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi now exercises unprecedented power over both the public and the private 
television systems. His control over the public broadcasting system RAI has tightened to 
the point where major broadcasting trade unions are objecting to sinister forms of 
‘manipulation’ of RAI news output and documenting it all in a ‘White Book’, while 
many critics believe RAI news is being deliberately turned into a distraction rather than a 
credible source of information. The Italian Government is poised, early in 2004, to 
privatise parts of the RAI system. 
 
In Ireland, Ray Burke, Minister for Communication in the early 1990s, had a 
devastatingly negative impact on public service broadcasting and this alerted many 
people to the dangers that can arise when political power is abused. Could RTÉ be 
damaged in the future by massive political influence? Will its structures of regulation and 
governance, once the new Broadcasting Act is passed, always pass the Berlusconi test? In 
order to ensure that government will not react aggressively against it in the future, will 
RTÉ always be able to follow its editorial, rather than its political instincts, when it is 
timely to critique government performance? In a much more competitive broadcasting 
environment, will RTÉ be able to project the ‘whiff of danger’ that audiences 
increasingly want, particularly when it turns its cameras on the politics of corporate 
Ireland? There has been one positive development in recent years: the changes brought 
about by the Freedom of Information initiative. One of the main reasons for the decline in 
overt pressure on broadcasters from powerful interests in political institutions is the 
knowledge that what may be intended as a quiet word in the ear of the Chairman or the 
Director General may well end up on the front page of a newspaper or in a feature story 
in a current affairs television programme. The very real possibility of publicity is itself 
one of the principal bulwarks against interference.    
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